Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Boyd Lee
Preece, Defendant/Appellant : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gregory N. Skabelund; Attorney for Appellant.
Tony C. Baird; Deputy Cache County Attorney; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Preece, No. 970576 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1101

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

U I AH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50

GREGORY N. SKABELUND #5346
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
2176 North Main
Logan, UT 84341
(435) 752-9437

DOCKET NO.

l/ns-lfrffr

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-oooOOOoooSTATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 970576-CA

v.
BOYD LEE PREECE,

Priority No. 15
Defendant/Appellant.

-oooOOOooo-

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

THIS IS AN APPEAL OF A JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR CACHE COUNTY, UTAH
THE HONORABLE BURTON H. HARRIS

GREGORY N. SKABELUND #5346
2176 North Main
Logan, UT 84341

(435) 752-9437
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
TONY BAIRD
Deputy Cache County Attorney
11 West 100 North, 2nd Floor
Logan, UT 84321

(435) 752-8920
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

FILED
MAY 1 1 1998
COURT OF APPEALS

GREGORY N. SKABELUND #5346
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
2176 North Main
Logan, UT 84341
(435) 752-9437
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-oooOOOoooSTATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 970576-CA

v.
BOYD LEE PREECE,

Priority No. 15
Defendant/Appellant.

-oooOOOooo-

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

THIS IS AN APPEAL OF A JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR CACHE COUNTY, UTAH
THE HONORABLE BURTON H. HARRIS

GREGORY N. SKABELUND #5346
2176 North Main
Logan, UT 84341

(435) 752-9437
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
TONY BAIRD
Deputy Cache County Attorney
11 West 100 North, 2nd Floor
Logan, UT 84321

(435) 752-8920
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Table of Contents

i

Table of Authorities

ii, iii

Jurisdiction of Court

1

Issues Presented For Review, Standard of Review,
and Citation of Record

1

Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances,
Rules, and Regulations

3

Statement of Case

4

Statement of Facts

5

Summary of Argument

9

Argument

9

Conclusion and Request for Relief

22

Certificate of Service

23

Addendum:
- Sentence, Judgment, Commitment - dated September 16, 1997
- Notice of Appeal - dated October 2, 1997
- Stipulation for Entry of Certificate of Probable Cause - dated October 24, 1997
- Amended Notice of Appeal - dated October 24, 1997
- Order on Probable Cause - dated November 10, 1997

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
A.

STATUTES:
41-6-44(1) Utah Code Annotated
41-6-44(2) Utah Code Annotated
41-6-44(2)(a)(i) Utah Code Annotated

7,16, 18, 21
9, 21
3, 9, 15

18,22
41-6-44(2)(a)(ii) Utah Code Annotated
41-6-44.3 Utah Code Annotated
41-6-44.3(3) Utah Code Annotated
41-6-69(1 )(a) Utah Code Annotated
78-2a-3(e) Utah Code Annotated
B.

3
7, 16
9, 21
4, 14
1

CASES:
City of Orem v. Crandall. 760 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1988)

18

Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396,
59 L.Ed 2.d 660 (1979)

4

Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400
Elkins v. United States. 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446-47,
4 L.Ed 2.d 1669 (1960)
Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590,
680 P.2d 121, 127 (1983)

10, 11

10
20, 21

People v. Loucks, 135 III. App. 3.d 530, 481 N.E. 2.d 1086 (1985) . .

12

Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990)

21

State v. Cavanauqh. 230 Neb. 889, 434 N.W. 2.d 36 (1989)

12

State v. Clark. 35 Or. App. 851, 583 P.2d 1142, 1145(1978)

19,20

State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983)

11

State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993)

3

ii

State v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786, 787 N.2 (Utah 1988)
State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Cir. App. 1992)
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994)

2
11
9, 11
2,3

State v. Scholosser, 774 P.2d 1132. 1135 (Utah 1989)

10

State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 882 note #2 (Utah App. 1989)

11

Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 973,
20 L.Ed 2.d 889 (1968)

9r 10

U.S. Const. Amend. IV

10

United States v. Cummings. 920 F.2d 498, 599 (8th Circuit 1990) . . 1 1
Utah R.Crim. P.4(b)

13

Utah R.Crim. P.4(d)

13

m

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-000OOO000-

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 970576-CA

BOYD LEE PREECE,
Priority No. 15
Defendant/Appellant.

-000OOO000-

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions
of Section 78-2a-3(e) of Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARD OF REVIEW,
AND CITATION OF RECORD
POINT I
WHETHER TROOPER TROY DENNY'S STOP OF THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S
VEHICLE WAS ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE TROOPER DENNY
LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP DEFENDANT/APPELLANTS VEHICLE.
The issue preserved by the Defendant/Appellant is whether the trial court
committed error in finding that Trooper Troy Denny had probable cause to stop
Defendant/Appellant's vehicle.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court has the primary responsibility for making determinations of fact,
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). A trial court's findings of fact in a
criminal bench trial are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, State v.
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 N.2 (Utah 1988). A trial court's finding is clearly
erroneous when it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or, although there is
evidence to support it, the court reviewing the record is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made, Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36.
CITATION OF RECORD
Judgment and Sentence (1Rec. 87).
POINT II
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT MADE AN UNSAFE LANE CHANGE.
The issue preserved by the Defendant/Appellant is whether the trial court
committed error in finding that the Defendant/Appellant made an unsafe lane change.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
See. Point I above.
CITATION OF RECORD
See Point I above.

All references are of record; Rec. refers to record.
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POINT III
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT
§41-6-44(2)(i) DESCRIBES THE CONDITIONS IN SAID STATUTE AS A
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION RATHER THAN PRESUMPTIVE.
The issue preserved by the Defendant/Appellant is whether the trial court
committed error in concluding that §41-6-44(2)(i) describes the conditions in said
statute as a conclusive presumption rather than presumptive.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of Review to review the trial court's determination of the law is a
correctness standard, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). An appellate
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer any degree of the trial court's
deference of law, State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).
CITATION OF RECORD
See Point I above.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES. AND REGULATIONS
Section 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) and (ii) provide:
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by the chemical test given within two hours after
the alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
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Section 41-6-69(1 )(a) Utah Code Annotated provides:
A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a
roadway or change lanes until the movement can be made with
reasonable safety and an appropriate signal has been given.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of Case:
Defendant/Appellant seeks a reversal of a Judgment and Sentence of conviction

finding the Defendant/Appellant guilty of driving with .08 blood alcohol content and
guilty of unsafe lane change.
B.

Course of Proceeding:
Defendant/Appellant was arrested on March 10, 1997, for DUI and was

subsequently charged with Operating or Being in Actual Physical Control of a Motor
Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs; Driving with Breath/Blood
Alcohol Concentration of .08 grams or Greater and/or Being in Actual Physical Control;
Open Container of Alcohol in a Vehicle; and Unsafe Lane Change. A Motion to
Suppress Hearing was held on May 21, 1997. Trial was held on August 8, 1997.
Defendant/Appellant was sentenced and a Sentence, Judgment, Commitment was
signed and entered on September 16, 1997. A Notice of Appeal was signed and
entered on October 2, 1997. A Stipulation for Entry of Certificate of Probable Cause
and to Amend Notice of Appeal was signed and entered on October 24, 1997. An
Amended Notice of Appeal was signed and entered on October 24, 1997. An Order on
Certificate of Probable Cause was signed and entered on November 10, 1997.
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C.

Disposition of the Court below:
Judgment, Sentence, Commitment was signed and entered on September 16,

1997. A Notice of Appeal was signed and entered on October 2, 1997. An Amended
Notice of Appeal was signed and entered on October 24, 1997. A Certificate of
Probable Cause was signed and entered on October 24, 1997.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about March 10, 1997, at 10:30 p.m., Trooper Troy Denny was westbound
out of Richmond, Utah, on SR142 when he noticed a Ford truck with a camper shell
driving at a slow rate of speed with its left/hand blinker on (1Rec. 32 & 33).
Trooper Denny turned around and pulled behind the truck when it made a left hand turn
signal onto Main Street in Lewiston (1Rec. 33). Trooper Denny followed the truck North
on Main Street with a speed of about 25 mph (1Rec. 34). Trooper Denny closely
followed the truck ( 3 - 4 car lengths) for approximately a quarter mile when the truck
2

pulled to the right of the road and back on without signaling to allow Trooper Denny's

1

All references are of record; Rec. refers to record.

2

On cross-examination, Trooper Denny testified at the time of the stop that Defendant/Appellant
was not impeding traffic or causing any hazard and that Defendant/Appellant "slightly pulled" to the right
side of the road (1Rec. 50).
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vehicle to go 1by (2Rec. 34), at which time Trooper Denny made a traffic 3stop (2Rec.
34, 50 & 51 )4.
Once Trooper Denny stopped the Defendant/Appellant's truck, he approached
the truck and smelled an odor of alcohol coming from Defendant/Appellant's truck.
Trooper Denny also noticed a case of beer in Defendant/Appellant's truck and a beer
can between the passenger and the driver (2Rec. 35). Trooper Denny asked the
Defendant/Appellant if he had been drinking and the Defendant/Appellant responded,
"Yes." Trooper Denny then testified that he asked the Defendant/Appellant to perform
the field sobriety tests (2Rec. 35 & 36). The Defendant/Appellant was asked and
performed the horizontal eye gaze nystagmus test, the one-legged stand, and the walk
and turn 5test (2Rec. 36). Upon the conclusion of the test, Trooper Denny reached an
opinion that the Defendant/Appellant was unsafe to drive or operate a motor vehicle

Defendant/Appellant testified he was looking at properties, or land for sale, and as he turned
towards Richmond, the [Trooper Denny's vehicle] approached him from behind and came extremely close
(2Rec. 64). Defendant/Appellant then testified he pulled over a little bit to the highway edge to allow
[Trooper Denny's] vehicle to go by (2Rec.64).
2

AII references are of record; Rec. refers to record.

3

Defendant/Appellant's witness, Todd Preece, testified that he was an occupant in
Defendant/Appellant's vehicle and that Defendant/Appellant pulled over a little bit to let the officer go by
(2Rec. 58), and does not recall Defendant/Appellant pulling off the side of the road and coming back on
(2Rec. 60-61).
4

At the Suppression Hearing held on May 21,1997, Trooper Denny testified that he did not cite the
Defendant/Appellant for any traffic violations (2Rec. 15). Trooper Denny was suspicious of the
Defendant/Appellant's pattern of activity, whether he was showing signs of impairment or that he was a
farmer living in the vicinity and was looking at his fields (2Rec. 15,16 & 18).
5

Defendant/Appellant testified that he had problems taking these tests because he was overweight
and had an inner-ear infection which affected his balance. Defendant/Appellant also testified the Trooper
Denny had him take off his glasses and wasn't able to see very well without his bifocals (2Rec. 67).
Defendant/Appellant also testified the surface of the roadway was gravelly with some loose pebbles or
rocks which affected his [balance] (2Rec. 68).
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(1Rec. 38) whereupon Trooper Denny placed the Defendant/Appellant in handcuffs and
took him to where Defendant/Appellant gave a breath sample (1Rec. 38). The
intoxilizer printout established Defendant/Appellant had a breath alcohol of .101
(1Rec. 49; Plaintiffs Exhibit 4).
Trooper Denny testified that an hour and a half had elapsed at the time
Defendant/Appellant was arrested and the by the time the Defendant/Appellant took the
intoxilizer test (1Rec. 77).
Trooper Denny testified that at the time of the arrest Defendant/Appellant's
blood alcohol could have been a .09 or .085 (1Rec. 77). Trooper Denny further testified
that he was familiar with the Widmark Formula, and that the formula determines the
alcohol rate of consumption and the metabolic rate is .15 per hour (1Rec. 77). Trooper
Denny then testified that if you times that by \-V* [hours], that would put it at 2-%
(1Rec. 77 and 78). Trooper Denny was then asked if this would put the
Defendant/Appellant under the legal limit of .08 (1Rec. 78). At that time, Mr. Draper, the
Cache County Prosecutor, objected on the basis of irrelevance and the following
colloquy took place between defense counsel, prosecutor and the court (1Rec. 78):
MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, I think I'm going to object to this line of questioning based
on relevance. The statutes are very clear that, that if the test is given within two hours
there's, there's, it's pretty well conclusive of what the test was at the time of driving.
THE JUDGE: It's a conclusive presumption under the statute.

1

All references are of record; Rec. refers to record.
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MR. SKABELUND: That's right?
THE JUDGE: So I'll sustain the objection," (1Rec. 78).
At conclusion of Trial, the court made its findings that the incident occurred
March 10, 1997, in the Richmond/Lewiston area in Cache County, State of Utah, that
the officer was traveling westbound and observed a vehicle of slowness at 10:00 p.m.
traveling at a slow rate of speed in an open area of the county that was uninhabited.
The officer turned around and followed the vehicle (1Rec. 86). The
Defendant/Appellant pulled off to the right side of the road without signaling (1Rec. 87).
The Defendant/Appellant smelled of alcohol and went through the field sobriety testing.
The court recognized that the Defendant/Appellant had an inner-ear infection that could
effect his balance. The court then found that the officer had probable cause to stop the
Defendant/Appellant and that because of the odor of alcohol and when the tests were
performed, the officer had sufficient belief to place the Defendant/Appellant under
arrest. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 showed that there was .101 blood alcohol level which is
higher than the legal limit which is .08, and as a result the court found the
Defendant/Appellant not guilty of the DUI and guilty of the .08 blood alcohol content.
The court also found the Defendant/Appellant guilty of Open Container in a Motor
Vehicle and guilty of an Unsafe Lane Change (1Rec. 88-89).

Ali references are of record; Rec. refers to record.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court committed error in finding that Trooper Troy Denny had probable

cause to stop Defendant/Appellant's vehicle in that Trooper Denny lacked any
reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant/Appellant was committing a traffic
violation as set forth in the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
973, 20 L.Ed 2.d 889 (1968) and State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).
II.

The trial court committed error in finding Defendant/Appellant made an unsafe

lane change given that the Information filed with the action did not require a signal.
The clear weight of the evidence established that the Defendant/Appellant did make
movement upon the highway and that such movement was made with reasonable
safety.
III.

The trial court committed error in concluding that §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) describes the

conditions in said statute as a conclusive presumption rather than presumptive. Both
§41-6-44(2) and §41-6-44.3(3) and both Crandall and Walker cases clearly establish
that the Utah State Legislature did not intend §41-6-44(2) to be a conclusive
presumption.
ARGUMENT
(Point I)
TROOPER DENNY LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP
DEFENDANT/APPELLANTS VEHICLE IN THAT THE TROOPER LACKED ANY
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
WAS COMMITTING A TRAFFIC VIOLATION.

9

It was error for the trial court to find in the Trial that Trooper Denny had probable
cause to stop the Defendant/Appellant's vehicle given that Trooper Denny had no
reasonable articulable suspicion that the Defendant/Appellant had committed, or was
about to commit, a traffic violation.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees "the right
of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The United States
Supreme Court has held that "stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitutes a seizure," within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "even though the
purpose of the stop is limited to resulting detention quite brief," Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed 2.d 660 (1979). "Thus, although a
person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his own home, one does not
lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile," State v.
Scholosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (Citations omitted).
However, "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
unreasonable searches and seizures," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 973,
20 L.Ed. 2.d 889 (1968), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct.
1437, 1446-47, 4 L.Ed. 2.d 1669 (1960). To determine whether a search or seizure is
constituted as reasonable, we must make a dual inquiry: (1) was the officer's action
justified in its inception, and (2) was the resulting detention reasonably related to the
scope of the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. A

10

constitutionally justified stopping of a vehicle is sufficient when "an observed traffic
violation gives the officer 'at least a probable cause to believe the citizen has
committed a traffic offense/" State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 note #2 (Utah App.
1989). See also United States v. Cummings, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Circuit 1990)
holding that "when an officer observes a traffic offense, however minor, he has
probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle," State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123
(Utah 1983).
An observed violation, however, is not required. "Stopping a vehicle may be
also justified when the officer has reasonable articulate suspicion that the driver is
committing a traffic offense such as driving under the influence of alcohol or driving
without a license . . . [or that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity
such as transporting drugs," State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Cir. App.
1992). In other words of the United States Supreme Court, as long as an officer
suspects that "a driver is violating any one of the multiple applicable traffic or
equipment regulations, the police officer may legally stop the vehicle," Prouse, 440
U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400, quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).
In this particular circumstance, Trooper Denny, on March 10, 1997, noticed
Defendant/Appellant's truck driving at a slower rate of speed with a left/hand blinker on
(1Rec. 32-33). Trooper Denny turned around and followed the Defendant/Appellant's
truck. According to Trooper Denny's own testimony, he was 3-4 car lengths behind

1

All references are of record; Rec. refers to record.
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Defendant/Appellant's vehicle for approximately a quarter of a mile when the
Defendant/Appellant's vehicle pulled "slightly" to the right side of the road and back
without signaling (1Rec. 34). Trooper Denny also testified that Defendant/Appellant
was not impeding traffic or causing any hazard (1Rec. 50). Trooper Denny, at the
Suppression Hearing, had previously testified that he did not cite the
Defendant/Appellant for any traffic violations fRec. 15), and that Trooper Denny was
suspicious of the Defendant/Appellant's pattern of activities, whether he was showing
signs of impairment or that he was a farmer living in the vicinity looking at the fields
(1Rec. 15, 16 & 18).
To possess and articulable suspicion of illegal activity sufficient to justify
stopping of the vehicle, a police officer must have articulable reason to objectively
believe that the law has been violated, either by someone in the vehicle or by the
vehicle itself. The general rule is that for the stop to be legal, the operation of the
vehicle must appear to be more consistent with illegal than with lawful activity. See
People v. Loucks, 135 III. App. 3.d 530, 481 N.E. 2.d 1086 (1985) and State v.
Cavanaugh, 230 Neb. 889, 434 N.W. 2.d 36 (1989). Here, the articulable suspicion
should be found lacking in view of the circumstances and the stop not justified,
particularly when the officer testified the Defendant/Appellant was not impeding traffic
or causing any hazard, and when the officer himself questioned whether the
Defendant/Appellant had signs of impairment or was a farmer living in the vicinity

1

All references are of Record; Rec. refers to record.
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looking at his fields. Given the factors in this case, Trooper Denny lacked probable
cause to stop Defendant/Appellant's vehicle.
(Point II)
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT HAD MOVED RIGHT OR LEFT UPON A HIGHWAY OR
CHANGED LANES WHEN SUCH MOVE COULD NOT BE MADE IN REASONABLE
SAFETY.
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies what an Information
must provide to the defendant:
an . . . information shall charge the defendant of which the
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the
offense by common law, or by statute, or by stating in concise
terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the
defendant notice of the charge. Utah R.Crim. P.4(b).
[W]hat the defendant is entitled to is an information which
sufficiently informs him to enable him to understand the charge
against him and to prepare a defense.
Furthermore, an information may be:
amended at any time before verdict if no additional or different
offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defense are
not prejudiced. Utah R.Crim. P.4(d).
The Plaintiff/Appellee's Information filed in this action on Count 4 provides:
CRIME:
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
AT;
ON OR ABOUT:

Unsafe Lane Change
Section 41-6-69(1 )(a) U.C.A. 1953, as amended
Class C. Misdemeanor
Cache County, State of Utah
March 10, 1997

The acts of the Defendant constituting the public offense were:

13

That the said Defendant, on the day an dplace aforesaid, driver of
a vehicle, did move right or left upon a roadway or change lanes,
when such movement could not be made with reasonable safety
(1Rec. 2-4).
The language in §41-6-69 Utah Code Annotated provides additional language of
". . . and an 'appropriate signal1 has been given." It states in full as follows:
(1 )(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon
a highway or change lanes until the movement can be made
with reasonable safety when an appropriate signal has been
given.
Defendant/Appellant relied upon the language as set forth in the Information as
prepared by Plaintiff/Appellee.
The evidence established by the court establishes that: (1) the
Defendant/Appellant was not impeding traffic (2Rec. 50); (2) the Defendant/Appellant
was not causing any hazard (2Rec. 50); (3) the Defendant/Appellant had pulled slightly
to the right side of the road to allow the officer to pass (2Rec. 34, 50-60 & 61); (4) the
Defendant/Appellant was driving at a slow rate of speed of about 25 mph (2Rec. 34);
(5) Trooper Denny did not cite Defendant/Appellant for any traffic violation (2Rec. 15).
The reading of the Information does not provide that the Defendant/Appellant be
required to use signals (2Rec. 2-4). The court found the Defendant/Appellant guilty of
Unsafe Lane Change stating that Defendant/Appellant had "moved the vehicle upon
the right upon a highway without the signal which was viewed in the tape." The finding

All references are of court record; Rec. refers to record.
2

AII references are of record; Rec. refers to record.
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of the court was erroneous. The Information did not provide that a signal was required.
It was reversible error for the court to find Defendant/Appellant guilty of an unsafe lane
change when evidence was lacking that Defendant/Appellant made movement upon a
highway without reasonable safety.
(Point III)
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT
§41-6-44(2)(i) DESCRIBES THE CONDITIONS IN SAID STATUTE AS A
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION RATHER THAN PRESUMPTIVE.
The issue preserved by the Defendant/Appellant is whether the trial court
committed error in sustaining the State's objection that pursuant to §41-6-44(2)(a)(i)
that a chemical test is given within two (2) hours and that it is a "conclusive
presumption" that the Defendant/Appellant was driving while intoxicated.
On direct examination of Trooper Denny, the following colloquy took place:
"Defense Counsel: Officer Denney, just a couple questions I failed to ask before. You
indicated that you had some background, training and experience in intoxicated
persons. Is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And where did you get that training at?

A.

Through part of the training and qualification it takes to be hired with the

Highway Patrol and experience after that that's on-the-job experience.
Q.

Okay. With that background and training did you study or become

educated in how alcohol works upon a person?
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A.

I've got a knowledge of it.

Q.

Does that background and training also tell you how fast alcohol can be

absorbed in the system?
A

It is taught. I don't remember exactly what it is. At one time it was told to

Q.

Okay. You indicated that the intoxilizer printout was at .10. Is that

me.

correct?

A.

101.

Q.

101?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Based upon your background and training do you have an idea of what

type of alcohol, the blood alcohol would have been of Mr. Preece at the time of the
arrest if an hour and a half, hour and a half would have lapsed since the time of the
arrest until the time he took the intoxilizer test?
A.

I could do it with the numbers. At the time right now in my head I don't

have an idea. It, it would be higher, possibly a 1, a 12.
Q.

Okay. That's if he, if he was coming down. Is that correct?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

What if he was going up?

16

A.

At the time of the arrest if he was going up and given the circumstances,

he gave a .101 at the time that he did, my guess would be that he would be about a .09,
.085.
Q.

Okay. And you indicated an hour and a half had lapsed during the period

which he took the intoxilizer test and the time he was arrested. Is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Are you aware of the, the Widmark formula?

A.

What formula is that?

Q.

The formula that determines what the alcohol rate of consumption would

have been at the time, certain periods of time?
A.

I'm, I'm aware of it.

Q.

My understanding is the metabolic is .15 per hour. Is that correct?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And if a n - And if you times that by 1->2, that would put it about 2.5. Is

that correct?
A.

.15not~

Q.

.15 per hour times that by 1-14 or 1-V£ hours that would be approximately

2-1A Is that correct?
THE JUDGE: 2-1A Mr. Skabelund.
MR. SKABELUND: 2-1A
THE WITNESS: That's correct.
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MR. SKABELUND: Would that have put Mr. Preece under the legal limit or under a
.08 if you deducted that out of the 1.10 minus the 2-%?
MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, I think I'm going to object to this line of questioning based
on relevance. The statutes are very clear that, that if the test is given within two hours
there's, there's, it's pretty well conclusive of what the test was at the time of driving.
THE JUDGE: It's a conclusive presumption under the statute.
MR. SKABELUND: That's right.
THE JUDGE: So I'll sustain the objection," (1Rec. 76-78).
Based upon the testimony of Trooper Denny prior to the objection being made by
the State and the responses that had been made by Trooper Denny thereto, Trooper
Denny would/could have to conclude from his previous responses that if the metabolic
rate is .15 per hour times 1-1/4, you would have approximately 2-/4 which would have
rebutted the presumption and placing Defendant/Appellant below .08 breath alcohol.
In Cityof Oremv. CrandalL 760 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah Court of
Appeals stated:
The statute [41-6-44(2)(a)(i)] does not suggest that if a person
has a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater that he is
presumed guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol.
In the City of Orem v. Crandall supra, the Utah Court of Appeals pred a reading
of 2§41 -6-44(1) alleging that it creates a conclusive presumption. A reading of the

1

AH references are of record; Rec. refers to record.

2

renumbered as §41-6-44(2)
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statute shows that the language pertaining to .08 is merely conduct that is prohibited
and raises no presumption, conclusive or otherwise.
To the contrary, the statute provides for a violation of law in two (2) separate
ways. The first is that the legislature has determined that it is a violation of law to drive
a vehicle with blood alcohol content of .08 or greater. This is merely prohibitive
conduct regardless of what that blood alcohol may have on the person actually
operating the motor vehicle and his ability to operate it safely. In addition, the statute
provides that regardless of the blood alcohol content of the driver of the vehicle, if the
driver's ability to operate the vehicle safely is impaired because of alcohol ingestion,
the conduct is a separate violation. The issue of whether or not the legislatures
determination that the driving with blood alcohol level of .08 or greater is
constitutionally sound is not before us.
This court went on to state that the Oregon Court of Appeals considered the
constitutionality of the statute similar to Utah's in State v. Clark, 35 Or. App. 851, 583
P.2d 1142, 1145 (1978). Under the Oregon statute, an individual could be found guilty
of driving while under the influence of intoxicants if he had a blood alcohol level of .10
or greater, or if he is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or a dangerous drug, or
a narcotic drug, i d , 583 P.2d at 1143. The defendant in Clark . . . claims that the
privilege nor the statute prohibiting driving with a .10 blood alcohol level was
unconstitutional because it created an impossible conclusive presumption.
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The Oregon court rejected the argument and found that driving with a blood
alcohol level of .10 or greater is an alternative statutory definition of the offense, not a
conclusive presumption. The Oregon court noted that certain blood alcohol levels
which "the legislature has seen fit to forbid . . . without more" k i In this regard, the
Oregon court found that the evidence tending to establish the blood alcohol level and
that the defendant's right to attack this evidence crucial to the determination that the
statute did not create a conclusive presumption.
Similarly, in Fuenning v. Superior Court 139 Ariz. 590, 680 P.2d 121, 127
(1983), the Arizona Supreme Court found that Arizona statute would prohibit driving
with a .10 or more blood alcohol level did not create an impermissible presumption
because the defendant could attack the accuracy of the test on relevant ground,
including inherent margin of error. Thus, the court reasoned, "conviction is impossible,
and the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's blood alcohol level
at the time of driving or controlling the vehicle was .10 or greater, not simply on the
basis of the test results of .10 or greater."
The Utah Court of Appeals then went on to state that the Utah Legislature, in
keeping with other jurisdictions, has "see fit to provide this act. . . without more . . ."
Although, the statutorily prescribed level in Utah is .08 rather than .10, we do not
consider the difference in the level prescription relevant to the determination of the
State's constitutionality on the issue of conclusive presumption. The Utah statute does
not create a conclusive presumption because, like the statutes in question in Clark and

20

Fuenning, 1§41-6-44(1) allows the defendant to challenge the accuracy of the test on
any relevant ground. See Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.3 (1987). The Utah statute
merely prohibits driving or controlling the vehicle with blood alcohol level of .08 or
more, not driving or controlling a vehicle when a test shows a level of .08 or more. The
Crandall court then made a ruling that 1§41-6-44(1) does not create a conclusive
presumption.
In 1987, an amendment to 1§41-6-44(1) added language stating that it was
unlawful for a person to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a
blood alcohol content of .08 or greater "as shown by a chemical test given within two
hours after the alleged operation or physical control."
In Richfield City v. Walker 790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990), this court stated:
The nature of the offense and the prohibited conduct are not
changed by this amendment which only further describes the
conditions that were wrought in a presumption of intoxication.
It was error for the trial court to conclude that pursuant to §41-6-44(2) driving
with a .08 blood alcohol creates a "conclusive presumption." The reading of
§41-6-44(2), §41-6-44.3(3), and both the Crandall and Walker cases clearly
establishes that the Utah State Legislature did not intend §41-6-44(2) to be a
conclusive presumption but rather a rebuttable presumption. It was committed
reversible error in concluding 1§41-6-44(1) creates a conclusive presumption.

1

renumbered as §41-6-44(2)
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CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Trooper Denny lacked probable cause to stop Defendant/Appellant's vehicle and
lacked the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion that the Defendant/Appellant
had committed a traffic violation. The court committed reversible error in concluding
that §41-6-44(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated is a "conclusive presumption." Thereby, it
was error for the court to sustain the State's objection when Defendant/Appellant was
establishing that at the time of the arrest, Defendant/Appellant's breath alcohol was
under the legal limit, or .08. Additionally, the State failed to establish that
Defendant/Appellant moved left or right upon the highway and that such movement was
not made with reasonable safety.
Defendant/Appellant requests that the court reverse the Judgment and Sentence
of the trial court and at least remand the case back to the District Court allowing
Defendant/Appellant to put on the requisite evidence to establish whether
Defendant/Appellant's breath alcohol was under .08 at the time of the arrest.
DATED this

//_ day of May, 1998.

Iregg/y ^kabelund
Attorney for DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Tony Baird
Deputy Cache County Attorney
I I West 100 North
2nd Floor
Logan, UT 84321
DATED this

//

day of May, 1998.
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FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 975000499 MD

BOYD L PREECE,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

BURTON H. HARRIS
September 16, 1997

PRESENT
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GREGORY SKABELUND
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 9, 1942
Audio
Tape Number:

97-241

Tape Count: 96
Clerk:

angeladb

CHARGES
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/1997 Not Guilty - Bench
OPEN CONTAINER/DRINKING ALC IN VEH - Class C Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/1997 Guilty - Bench
TURN/STOP/CHANGE LANES W/O SIGNAL - Class C Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/1997 Guilty - Bench
HEARING
TAPE 97-241
COUNT 9 6 On record
Defendant present w/counsel, Gregory Skabelund
Defendant sentenced to 180 days jail, 178 days suspended; fine of
$1200 to be paid at rate of $100 per month beginning October 1,
1997; to enter and complete alcohol counseling and file certificate
of completion with the court
No alcohol clause; submit to search and seizure and random
testing; to write monthly letters beginning November 1, 1997; to
report to jail on September 24, 1997 at 5:00 p.m.; on count 2-fine
Page 1

Case No: 975000499
Date:
Sep 16, 1997
of $110 and 10 days jail time, suspended upon payment of fine;
count 3-fine of $57 and 10 days jail time, suspended
Off record
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 180 day(s) in the Cache County Jail. The total time
suspended for this charge is 178 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPEN CONTAINER/DRINKING ALC
IN VEH a Class C Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 10 day(s) in the Cache County Jail. The total time suspended
for this charge is 10 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of TURN/STOP/CHANGE LANES W/O
SIGNAL a Class C Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 10 day(s) in the Cache County Jail. The total time suspended
for this charge is 10 day(s).
Defendant is to report to the Cache County Jail.
The Defendant is to report on September 24, 1997 at 5:00 pm.
Defendant is to complete jail service by September 26, 1997.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1200.00
$0.00
$548.14
$1200.00

Charge # 2

Fine
Suspended
Due

$110.00
$0.00
$110.00

Charge # 3

Fine
Suspended
Due

$57.00
$57.00
$0.00

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Amount Due

$1367.00
$57.00
$548.14
$1310.00
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Case No: 975000499
Date:
Sep 16, 1997

SCHEDULED TIMEPAY
The following cases are on timepay 975000499.
The defendant is to pay $100.00 monthly on the 1st.
The number of payments scheduled is 12.
The first payment is due on 10/01/1997 the final payment of $110.00
is due on 10/01/1998.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 1 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by First District Court.
Defendant to serve 2 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Cache County Jail.
Defendant is to report on September 24, 1997.
Defendant is to complete jail service by September 26, 1997.
Defendant is to pay a fine of $1310.00 which includes the
surcharge.
Pay fine to FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Complete alcohol and/or drug counseling - pay all fees and file
notice of completion with the Court.
Consume or possess no alcohol/drugs - frequent no places alcohol
served or consumed including bars, parties, liquor store.
Submit to random search and seizure.
Submit to testing upon request of law enforcement.
Keep Court informed of current address while on probation.
Defendant will report to Court in writing the first of each month.
Dated this

\"\ day of^.^r^totyW. I
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Gregory Skabelund #5346
Attorney at Law
2176 North Main
Logan, UT 84341
(801)752-9437

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

v
BOYD LEE PREECE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 975-499
Judge Burton H. Harris

Notice is hereby given that Defendant/Appellant, BOYD LEE PREECE, by and
through counsel, Gregory Skabelund, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final
judgment and sentence of the Honorable Burton H. Harris entered in this matter on
September 16, 1997. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment and sentence.
DATED this f - ^ day of October, 1997.

J^J_

Gfegory^skabelund
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Scott Wyatt
Cache County Attorney
I I West 100 North
2nd Floor
Logan, UT 84321
DATED this _£7__day of October, 1997.
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Gregory Skabelund #5346
Attorney at Law
2176 North Main
Logan, UT 84341
(801)752-9437

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
AND TO AMEND NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff/Appellee,

BOYD LEE PREECE,

Case No. 975-499

Defendant/Appellant.

Judge Burton H. Harris

Defendant/Appellant, BOYD LEE PREECE, by and through counsel, Gregory
Skabelund, and the State of Utah, by and through counsel, Bruce Ward, hereby
stipulate to the entry of a Certificate of Probable Cause and to amend
Defendant/Appellant's Notice of Appeal in the above-entitled matter.
DATED this _ ^ ? Y d a y of October, 1997.

^Gfegory Skabelund
Attorney for Defendant

DATED this

"T

1Au

day of October, 1997.

Bruce^/ard^X L ^ 7 y
/
Deputy Cache County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND TO
AMEND NOTICE OF APPEAL in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Bruce Ward
Deputy Cache County Attorney
I I West 100 North
2nd Floor
Logan, UT 84321
DATED this 'lA day of October, 1997.

Gregory Skabelund #5346
Attorney at Law
2176 North Main
Logan, UT 84341
(801)752-9437

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

v
BOYD LEE PREECE,

Case No. 975-499

Defendant/Appellant.

Judge Burton H. Harris

Notice is hereby given that Defendant/Appellant, BOYD LEE PREECE, by and
through counsel, Gregory Skabelund, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final
judgment and sentence of the Honorable Burton H. Harris entered in this matter on
September 16, 1997. The appeal is taken from the denial of motion to suppress, and
the entire judgment and sentence.
DATED this D y

day of October, 1997.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Bruce Ward
Deputy Cache County Attorney
I I West 100 North
2nd Floor
Logan, UT 84321
DATED this ^ V d a y of October, 1997.

Gregory Skabelund#5346
Attorney at Law
2176 North Main
Logan, UT 84341

FIRST D I S T P I C T COURT

CACHE r'i<w

--

'97 NOV-7 PI ^ 9

(801)752-9437
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON PROBABLE CAUSE

v
BOYD LEE PREECE,

Case No. 975-499

Defendant.

Judge Burton H. Harris

The Court having reviewed Defendant's Application of Certificate of Probable
Cause, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That the Certificate of Probable Cause having been entered and Defendant's
sentence of fine, imprisonment and/or probation and any suspension and related
requirements of the Driver License Division are stayed pending and on appeal, and
forthwith released from the Cache County Jail.
DATED this \ C

day of November, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
ORDER ON PROBABLE CAUSE in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Randon Draper
Deputy Cache County Attorney
I I West 100 North
2nd Floor
Logan, UT 84321
DATED this

kv> day of November, 1997.

